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Abstract: This paper explores whether easy credit policy on the part of commercial banks 
or unfavorable macroeconomic condition is more responsible for a systemic failure in a banking 
system. It also pursues the question of how promptly a central bank should inject capital into a 
commercial bank that faces a default crisis. To address these questions, we construct an agent-
based model of asset and ﬁnancial markets that consist of asset traders, commercial banks and a 
central bank. Our simulation results show that microeconomic factors, e.g., easy credit policy of 
individual banks, are more responsible than negative macroeconomic shocks in inducing a systemic 
banking crisis. We also ﬁnd the commercial banks have an incentive to loosen their credit policies, 
which will lead to rapid credit expansion, and eventually to a systemic crisis through asset bubble. 
This result suggests the need for prudential regulation of commercial banks.
1. Introduction
There has been a surge of bank insolvencies since the late 1970s. Capiro and Klingebiel (1997) 
note that “(banking crises are) in many cases widespread enough to qualify as systemic1.” In fact, 
Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) reveal that 117 systemic banking crises have occurred in 93 countries, 
in a variety of industrial and developing countries during 1975-99. If the worst happens, a series of 
banking failures may trigger deﬂation. The Great Depression and Japan’s recent deﬂation teach us a 
lesson that deﬂation is not only devastating to the economy but also interminable once it starts.
Japan, was ailed by vicious deflationary spiral: Bad loans caused deflation and the deflation 
generated further bad loans 2. Although banking crises may not cause deflation, they certainly 
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1  Caprio and Klingebiel (1997) deﬁne bank insolvency as systemic “if loan losses are sufﬁcient to wipe 
out the system’s capital.”
2  Zero interest rate policy boosts the demand for cash holding, which urges ﬁrms with excessive debts 
to make debt repayment. In order to prepare sufﬁcient cash for repayment, these ﬁrms are forced to 
sell off their real assets, and to reduce investment spending. These decisions may be rational from an 
individual ﬁrm’s point of view because the values of real assets and the return on investment are falling, 
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make it worse. In fact, “in single crisis countries, inﬂation usually falls once a banking crisis starts. 
Inﬂation almost always falls further when a banking crisis ends3.”
Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) find the resolution of bank insolvency to be very expensive, 
placing a heavy burden on the country and on the government’s budget. When systemic banking 
failures break out, “they can drain a country’s ﬁnancial, institutional, and policy resources-resulting 
in large losses, misallocated resources, and slower growth4.” During 1992-2002, the total cost that 
Japanese banks spent to write off their bad loans amounted to 88 billion yen, or 16 percent of GDP.5 
Caprio and Klingebiel (1997) also note that “Argentina in the early 1980s likely saw the largest 
relative loss (estimated variously at 20-55 percent of GDP), with Chile not far behind (1302 percent 
of GDP).”
The bursting of asset price bubbles often triggers banking failures. Before it is publicly 
acknowledged that banks are insolvent, there is a phase in which the banks sharply accumulate a 
large number of non-performing loans on their balance sheets, as pointed out by Claessens, Djankov 
and Mody (2001), Claessens, Klingebiel and Laeven (2001) and Beim (2001). Claessens, Djankov 
and Mody (2001) further notes that “this situation is often accompanied by generally depressed 
asset prices, such as equity and real estate prices, following typical run ups before the crisis, sharp 
real interest rate increases, and a slowdown of or reversal in capital ﬂows.”
Typically, money, created by banks flows into stock and property markets, drives up asset 
prices and stimulates an economy. Autonomous reversal of trend or a change in monetary policy 
causes the bubble to burst, thus precipitating stock and real estate prices. As a result, the balance 
sheets of companies, individuals, and commercial banks, are substantially damaged. This means 
that there are serious shortages of capital for banks. Since banks are major providers of risk money 
for businesses, this will result in considerable decline in investment6. One of the insightful papers 
by Kobayashi (2003b) points out “assuming that the banks need to hold liquid assets to produce 
transaction services associated with the deposits, the growth of unbacked deposits forces banks to 
increase their holdings of liquid assets and to decrease loans to ﬁrms.” Such a situation is seriously 
detrimental to an economy as a whole. Thus, preventing or alleviating ﬁnancial distress is crucially 
important for the health of an economy.
but only worsening deation. Facing the surge in defaults and bad loans, the monetary authority decides 
to adopt zero interest policy to help banks, burdened with enormous non-performing loans. For more 
detailed explanation about debt deation and a systemic banking crisis in Japan, see (Kobayashi (2003a) 
and (2003b))
3  Boyd, et.al. (2001)
4  Capirio and Klingebiel (1997)
5  For more details, refer to the ofﬁcial home page of Financial Services Agency, http://www.fsa.go.jp/.
6  For more detailed argument, see for example, Stiglitz and Greenwald (2003).
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Effort has been made to identify a single cause of banking crises. Economy-wide factors, 
including recessions, certainly place tension on weak banks. As other causes of bank insolvency, 
Caprio and Kliengebiel (1997) list general uncertainty, asymmetric information, speculative 
bubbles, and ﬁnancial liberalization. The paper also cites a variety of regulatory and bank-speciﬁc 
management factors and emphasizes that “the evidence both undermines single-cause theories 
of insolvency and finds a more important role for microeconomic factors than is commonly 
conceded.”
Macroeconomic factors we will focus on in this paper are liquidation and credit standards. Since 
liquidating borrowers with non-performing loans is difﬁcult and costly, banks that are in trouble 
have incentive to delay liquidation, and thereby continuously loan out even when the interest 
payments from the distressed debtors are unpaid. The resulting tendency for the insolvent banks 
to forbear from liquidation would increase their losses. Risky incentive may exist even in the good 
time. For example, a strong macroeconomic climate can easily erode prudent banking discipline by 
weakening necessity for strict credit standard.
By building an agent-based simulation model with asset traders and a single commercial 
bank, and a central bank, Takahashi and Okada (2003) obtain the following results: (1) the more 
restrictive loan supply policy banks adopt, the more stable and sustainable the economy becomes; 
(2) the central bank’s intervention in the ﬁnancial market is likely to improve the performance of 
the economy if the commercial banks adopt loose loan supply and non-performing loan policies; (3) 
the intervention tends to be ineffective, or even harmful, if the commercial banks adopt stringent 
loan supply rules and prompt liquidation policies. These results suggest that microeconomic factors, 
rather than macroeconomic factors, are likely to be the key to triggering a banking crisis. However, 
explicit comparisons need to be made to discern which factors are more fundamental.
This paper aims to answer the following questions: what causes banking system to collapse? In 
particular, which factor is more essential for the health of a banking system: decline in credit and 
liquidation standards, or unfavorable macroeconomic conditions? What will happen when banks 
interact with each other in determining degrees of prudence? We also address the question of 
what the appropriate recapitalization policy would be for preventing the banking failures. We will 
further investigate when recapitalization is effective and preventive against the recurrence of bank 
insolvencies. The answers to these questions will help to shed some light on microeconomic factors 
which induce the health of a banking system, and thereby provide a hint on regulatory framework 
that allows banks to respond more robustly to macroeconomic shocks.
To serve these purposes, we construct an agent-based simulation model with asset traders, 
commercial banks and a central bank. The model both extended and simplified Takahashi and 
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Okada (2003): ﬁrst, in order to examine the effect of bank-speciﬁc management policies, the model 
incorporates a multiple number of commercial banks; second, unessential details are omitted, e.g., 
removing cash holdings by households, to keep the model simple.
In this artiﬁcial economy, there are a number of proprietors who buy or sell land in an asset 
market. They also determine the level of consumption depending on their incomes and wealth. In 
order to design an economic environment that is prone to asset price bubbles, the proprietors are all 
modeled as trend-chasers in the way they forecast the future prices of assets. Each commercial bank 
lends funds to prospective buyers of assets by creating bank deposits, which are the only means of 
settlement, i.e., money. The economy either exports the surplus of consumption goods, or imports 
its shortage, which is settled by the commensurate in ﬂow or outﬂow of short term securities. Since 
the size of these ﬂows determines the excess supply or demand of the securities, it affects the rate 
of interest.
The simulation results obtained in the paper are as follows: (1) microeconomic factors are 
more important than macroeconomic factors for the robustness of a banking system; (2) the 
wider disparity of prudence the banks adopt for credit and liquidation standards, the more fragile 
the banking system becomes; (3) given the credit and liquidation standards of other banks, it 
is in the interest of one bank to decline the standards prior to the peak of asset prices; (4) this 
means that there is a situation of prisoner’s dilemma in which individual banks are motivated to 
relax the standards, resulting in rapid credit growth; (5) this suggests the necessity for either the 
coordination or regulation of individual banking rules.
Section 2 describes the agent-based model, Section 3 presents simulation results, and Section 4 
discusses the results and future extensions. Section 5 concludes.
2. The Basic Model
Consider a small economy which consists of N proprietors, M commercial banks, and a central 
bank. The model allows of two interpretations: a small country and an isolated region in a country. 
In the former case, we need to assume that this economy adopts a pegged exchange rate system 
at the rate of unity with global currency. In the latter case, a central bank should be replaced by 
a branch of a central bank. In what follows, we regarded the economy as a small country. For the 
latter interpretation, foreign exchanges should be taken as short term domestic securities.
In this economy, there is only one kind of goods that people value, namely, the composite 
consumption commodity (the consumer goods). We assume that there exists neither tax nor 
government expenditure. There are two types of production factors, labor and land. The economy 
is endowed with N lots of land. Each proprietor works to produce W units of the consumer goods 
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every period. A proprietor can sell and buy land in an asset market. One lot of land produces R units 
of the consumer goods every period. The consumer goods are perishable and have the world price 
ﬁxed at unity.
All transactions among the proprietors must be mediated by bank deposits. The proprietors are 
either not allowed to hold foreign exchanges or to lend or borrow among themselves directly. Each 
bank accepts deposits from their customers. For simplicity, we assume that each of the customers 
can not choose her bank for a geographical reason. Each proprietor can buy land from a seller in 
exchange for the bank deposit. Thus, the settlement of this transaction is made by changing the 
holder of the bank deposit. As a consumer, every proprietor determines how much to spend on the 
consumer goods. The difference between her income and consumption appears as a change in the 
amount of her bank deposit. In general, the supply of and demand for the consumer goods for the 
economy as a whole do not balance, causing trade imbalance, which is ﬁnanced by a ﬂow of foreign 
exchanges.
Time is discrete and the economy continues until period T (t = 1, 2, ..., T). In each period, the 
real estate and ﬁnancial markets open, and transactions of land and funds are made, revising the 
land price and the interest rate.
2.1 Proprietors
Proprietors i owns Lnit units of land in time t. For expositional convenience, the consumer goods 
produced by one unit of land is referred to as rent and those produced by a worker as wage. For 
later reference, let I = { 1, 2, ... , N} denote the set of all the proprietors. Each proprietor possesses 
at time t, bank deposit, DPit. A negative value of DPi implies that she has borrowed a loan of the 
absolute value of DPi dollars from the bank. A landlord revises the disposable value of the lots she 
owns, ASit , as
ASit = PtLnit, (1) (1)
where Pt represents the market price of land. Net equity of Proprietor i is given by
Eit = DP it + ASit . (2) (2)
This gives the equity ratio of Proprietor i as ERi = E
i
ASi+max(DP i,0) .  .
The balance sheet of a proprietor with positive bank deposit DP > 0  becomes:
Table 1: Balance sheet of proprietor with deposit
Assets Liabilities + Equity
Land (AS)   
Bank Deposit (DP)
 
Equity (E)
Total(AS+DP) Total(E)
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The balance sheet of a proprietor who has borrowed from bank (DP < 0) is:
Table 2: Balance sheet of proprietor with loan
Assets Liabilities + Equity
Land (AS) Loan Outstanding (-DP) 
Equity (E)
Total (AS) Total (-DP+E)
Each proprietor receives interest income or makes interest payment depending on whether her 
bank account is positive or negative. Let r  denote the rate of interest on deposit and that of loan by 
r�. Net interest income of Proprietor i, Ii, is given by
I it(DP it ) =
� r�DP it for DP it < 0
rDP it for DP it ≥ 0. (3)
 (3)
Thus, the income of Proprietor i in period t, Y it , depends on the number of lots she owns and the 
amount of outstanding deposit or loan. This is shown as
Y it (Lnit, DP it ) = W + I it(DP it ) + R× Lnit + I it(DP it ) (4) (4)
The level of consumption is assumed to be dependent on income, Yt, and net wealth, Et as 
follows:
Ct = αycYt + βecEt, (5) (5)
where αyc  and βec  denote marginal propensities to consume out of income and net wealth, 
respectively.
2.2 Commercial Banks
We assume that each of M bank takes interest rates as exogenously given as a result of 
competition. The rate of interest changes according to the volume of the excess demand for funds in 
the ﬁnancial market. Each bank buys foreign exchanges if there is excess supply of funds, and sells 
them if there is shortage of funds. Thus holding of foreign exchanges can be positive or negative. 
The positive holding means the economy provides short-term capital to the foreign country while 
the negative holding means borrowing. The bank also has a deposit account at the central bank, 
denoted by Res. Just like an individual proprietor uses her bank deposit as means of payment, an 
individual bank uses its deposit as means of payment to the other banks. For simplicity, we assume 
that the banks try to keep the balance of their accounts at minimum by swapping them for foreign 
exchanges.
The absolute value of sum of min(0, DPi) is the loan outstanding (Lj) for each bank. The deposit 
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outstanding DPj is deﬁned similarly. We assume that the banks hold foreign exchanges, denoted by F, 
in the form of short term securities which bear interest.
The balance sheet for the bank, with positive holdings of both foreign exchanges and Res 
appears as:
Table 3: Balance sheet of commercial bank
Assets Liabilities+Capital
Loan Outstanding (Lj ) Deposit Outstanding (DPj)
Land (AS)
Foreign Exchanges (F ) Capital (E)
Reserves (Res)
Total (L + AS + F + Res) Total (DP + E )
Here, we assume that the interest rate on deposits are equal to that on foreign exchanges, which 
positively depends on the sum of their amounts held by the banks:
r = 2× r¯0
1 + exp
��
j DP
j−�j Lj
N×C0
� (6)
 
(6)
where r0  denotes the average interest rate, and C0 the average level of consumption, respectively. 
Since loans to domestic investors involve risk of bankruptcy, the banks charge higher interest rates 
on the loans. The risk premium, η = r� − r , is computed as the ratio of irrecoverable loans to 
total loans outstanding:
η =
�
i∈ΛEi�
j Lj
(7)
 
(7)
where Λ  denotes the set of liquidated borrowers.
Bank j sets a liquidation rule, Eˆj , which is the minimum level of net deposit such that each 
of their customers goes bankrupt when her capital level falls short of it. Liquidating distressed 
borrowers is needed for banks to raise liquidity. Asymmetric information and opacity involved 
in bank loans, however, often force a bank to sell off assets at much lower price than they could 
without them. To reflect this cost, each bank incurs liquidation cost, LQ, for each occurrence of 
bankruptcy. Bank j also sets across the board credit limit, ˆDP j , for all of their customers. As long 
as a borrower keeps the amount of her outstanding loan below this credit limit, the bank does not 
demand the reimbursement of the principal of the loan.
The bank makes a landlord to sell one unit of land when her balance sheet is badly damaged 
due to insufﬁcient income or expected decline in the land price, represented as follows:
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DP it + Y it − Litmax(0, Pt−4 − Pt−1) < ˆDP j. (8) (8)
The third term on the left hand side signiﬁes the expected capital loss. This rule can be interpreted 
as a defensive behavior, voluntarily taken by the landlord.
In general, generous credit standard, i.e., the large value of ˆDP j , will incur downside risk of 
decreased liquidation value due to the continuously declining land price. Meanwhile, strict credit 
standard may deprive the borrower of the chance to get over the ﬁnancial adversity. Credit limit 
depends on the ﬁnancial condition of the bank itself. A bank with adequate capital is willing to take 
risks whereas a bank with inadequate capital becomes reluctant to lend funds. This is the so called 
“restricted lending” problem. In an extreme case, the bank forces borrowers to pay back the loan 
to collect the funds it has lent. The level of loan affordability depends on the capital ratio of the bank 
and takes on value zero if the capital ratio, ERbt , stays below ERbmin and takes on the maximum value 
DP j* if it is above ER
b
max . Speciﬁcally, the bank updates the credit limit according to
ˆDP j =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 for ERbt < ERbmin
DP j∗ × ER
b
t−ERbmin
ERbmax−ERbmin
for ERbmin ≤ ERbt < Ebmax
DP j∗ for ERbt ≥ ERbmax.
(9)
 
(9)
For obviating a banking crisis, the credit limits turn out to be crucially important.
2.3 Supply of and Demand for Land
How attractive the land is relative to ﬁnancial assets determines the supply of and demand for 
land. In each period, a proprietor can sell or buy a single unit lot of land. The banks obtain land 
whenever they liquidate collateral for the non-performing loans. After transferring the ownership of 
the collateral by directly writing off the bad loans, the banks try to sell off the land. We assume that, 
in each period, an individual bank is allowed to sell off no more than Sb units of land when the land 
prices are falling.
　　In the land market, characterized as monopolistic competition, a seller adjusts the price 
gradually, with πL as the speed of adjustment, based on excess demand for the land, G.
Gt = Pt Dt − St
max(Dt, St) , (10)
 
(10)
and
Pt = πLGt + Pt−1. (11) (11)
where St denotes the supply of land and Dt the demand.
The description of land transaction is omitted since we follow Takahashi and Okada (2003) in 
determining the proprietors’ supply and demand.
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2.4 The Central Bank and Recapitalization
The central bank should decide when to inject capital into the banks. We assume that the 
monetary authority conducts recapitalization by providing an exogenously fixed amount of 
foreign exchanges,
p
Fˆ , to banks in trouble, i.e., when the bank’s capital ratio falls short of some 
predetermined level, EˆR.
2.5 Income Redistribution
In this economy “laissez-faire” policy would result in extremely unequal distribution of income 
and property. As a result, the asset market becomes increasingly thinner, and thereby extremely 
volatile. This requires us to install some income redistribution device. Here, let us introduce 
property tax. Any proprietor who owns more than or equal to two lots of land must pay τ  percent 
of property tax for each additional land in excess of one lot. This tax revenue is equally distributed 
among all the proprietors.
3. Simulation
This section describes the initial setting of parameters and presents simulation results.
3.1 Initial Setting
Each proprietor initially possesses one unit of land, i.e., Li0 and deposits outstanding DPi0 , 
which is uniformly distributed between $－5000 and $0. Table 4 shows the initial values of other 
parameters.
Table 4: Initial setting of parameters
N 100 M 2 W 500 R 500
T 100 r0 0.05 r¯0 0.05 r�0 0.07
αcy 0.9 βce 0.03 C0 1000 LQ 8000
ERbmin 5000 ERbmax 5ERbmin Sb ∞ πL 0.1p
Fˆ 300000 EˆR 0.03 τ 0.05 Eˆ 0.0
3.2 Reference Trends
Suppose that each of the banks can take either prudent or imprudent banking rules. To 
examine the effects of these microeconomic factors, we set two pairs of parameters as Rule1 and 
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Rule2 : (1) Rule1 = ( Eˆj = －0.0, ˆDP j  = －5,000); and (2) Rule2 = ( Eˆj = －10,000, ˆDP j  = －20,000).
First, we conduct simulation for two scenarios: The both banks follow (1) Rule1; and (2) Rule2. 
Figure 1 and Figure 2 plot the sample trends of the observation indices: the land price, the rate of 
interest, the money supply, and the bank’s capital ratio for each of these rules.
Second, in order to investigate how individual banks interact among themselves, we will focus 
on the credit limits. Fixing liquidation rule at Eˆj  = 0, each individual bank chooses ˆDP j  from the 
parameter space, {－5, －10, －20, －∞ } × 103.  Table 5 shows the period at which the central 
bank depletes all the capital.
Table 5: The length of periods central bank survives
ˆDP 1 = －5,000 －10,000 －20,000 －∞
ˆDP 2 =－5,000 ∞ 409 158 9
－10,000 - 845 125 36
－20,000 - -   58 21
－∞ - - - 27
Next, we assume that there is once and for all change in the value of W. W is kept at 500 during 
ﬁrst 50 periods, and reduced to 0.0 and kept at this level thereafter. This huge reduction in W is to 
capture a substantial macroeconomic shock. The Figure 3 shows the trends of major observation 
indices when the both banks follow Rule1. We will take a closer look at the case with ( ˆDP 1 , ˆDP 2 ) 
= (－8, －10) × 103.  Figure 4 shows the trends of the land prices, and the loans outstanding of the 
two banks. Furthermore, ﬁxing ˆDP j = －20,000 for the both banks, we also conducted a series of 
experiments with two different values of Sb, i.e., {3, ∞ } to examine the effect of liquidation speed 
on the land price and the money supply. See Figure 5.
The final experiment is conducted to answer the following question: Should a central bank 
conduct recapitalization in a preemptive manner, or only after a banking crisis becomes obvious? 
Figure 6 plots the land price and the bank capital ratios for (1) EˆR  = 0.10, and (2) EˆR  = 0.03.
4. Discussion
4.1 Macroeconomic versus Microeconomic Factors
As stated earlier, both macroeconomic and microeconomic factors involve systemic banking 
crises. In this paper, the credit and liquidation standards represented by Eˆj and ˆDP j  are among 
these microeconomic factors. Figure 1 shows that the prudent banking policy maintains the health 
of both the banks and the economy. This is because good credit discipline provide good business 
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environment by keeping the money supply fairly constant. In contrast, imprudent credit rule causes 
asset price bubbles and resulting in banking crises as shown in Figure 2. With prudent banking 
rules, the land prices and the money supply are fairly stable. Consequently, there is no need for 
capital injection. In Figure 2, the movement of the land prices and the money supply are more 
volatile. This result veriﬁes the observation by Caprio and Kliengebiel (1997): “Rapid credit growth 
often leads to or reﬂects a decline in the credit standards of individual banks.” As a result, banking 
crises recur.
On the other hand, the substantial decline in wage rate corresponds to a macroeconomic 
shock. Which of these factors are more potent causes of banking crises? Figure 2 and 3 allows us 
to compare banking policies with macroeconomic shocks. Figure 3 indicates that, when the both 
banks adopt prudent standards, the banking system remains healthy even when quite a large 
macro shock hits the economy. The comparison appears to suggest that microeconomic factors 
are key factors for banking crises. Prudent risk taking considerably makes a banking system 
robust to macroeconomic shocks. This result implies that with imprudent credit and liquidation 
rules, even a minor macroeconomic shock is likely to result in banking failures. This is because 
the imprudent banking is like throwing fuel on a ﬁre. It causes rapid credit growth and results in 
soaring asset prices. This, in turn, damages the balance sheets of the proprietors, and those of the 
banks eventually. This ﬁnding is consistent with historical evidence as Caprio and Klingebiel (1997) 
remark: “although macroeconomic factors are important, microeconomic and incentive factors 
likely are key to determining the magnitude of banking problems and in some cases are even the 
main cause.”
4.2 Incentive for Declining Standards
Table 5 shows that substantial disparity in the credit limits would cause the failures of banking 
system. Let us focus on two levels of credit limit, i.e., {50, 10} ~ 103. A bank with imprudent banking 
has far better chances to survive;  the imprudent bank outperforms the other bank with prudence. 
The customers transacting with an imprudent bank can take advantage of generous credit standard 
to buy land. Thus, they continue to buy land and thus accumulate their fortunes, assisted by steadily 
increasing asset prices, whereas the customers of the other bank misses the chance to be rich 
because the strict credit standard of their bank makes it difﬁcult to make use of loans. This arises as 
the constant out ﬂows of outstanding loans and deposits in the prudent bank’s balance sheet. Hence, 
even when both of the banks can beneﬁt from prudential banking, either of them has an incentive 
to deviate from it. Thus, when there is a huge disparity of these rules among the banks, the banking 
system are likely to become fragile.
Nonetheless, in the real world, it is unlikely to ﬁnd such substantial differences in credit and 
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liquidation standards among banks. This leads us to the next question. What if there is a smaller 
disparity in these rules? Consider ˆDP 1 =－10,000, ˆDP 2 =－8,000. Figure 4 shows that, until the 
bursting of an asset price bubble, the bank with less prudence earns more proﬁts by increasing the 
loans more rapidly than the bank of prudence. This is a situation like prisoner’s dilemma. When 
credit growth is underway, it is in each bank’s interest to be abreast or even ahead of other banks 
by declining the credit standard. However, the imprudent bank eventually gets hurt more severely 
after the bubble burst by the larger number of bankruptcy of their customers than the prudent rival 
does. Myopic incentive to decline these standards is likely to cause rapid credit growth, resulting in 
an asset price bubble.
This experimental result is consistent with the finding by Gavin and Hausmann (1996): “In 
short, these information problems imply that the very rapid expansion of bank balance sheets that 
occurs during a lending boom is likely, over time, to generate a deterioration of banks balance 
sheets.” When individual banks are motivated to decline standards, it may be hard for them to 
impose such discipline, which implies the necessity of prudential regulation of banks.
4.3 The Speed of Liquidating Assets
In liquidating distressed borrowers, the banks obtained the borrowers’ collateral assets. The 
question is how quickly the banks should sell off their assets? As shown in Figure 5, it is more 
beneﬁcial for the banks as well as the economy to dispose gradually these assets. A small value of Sb 
helps to stabilize the land price and the money supply greatly. The reason should be obvious. Slower 
disposal can help maintain asset prices while quick sales leads to sharp decline in their prices, 
inﬂating bad loans even more. Since individual banks may want to sell them off to avoid downward 
risk, some central organization for buying and selling bad loans may be needed for asset price 
stability.
4.4 Central Bank
Capital injection of public funds into private banks is not politically easy. Nonetheless, Figure 
6 suggests that expeditious recapitalization is necessary and helpful. Preempting recapitalization 
will help banks to maintain their credit creation. This, by stabilizing the land price, will prevent the 
bad loans, thus keeping the banks’ capital ratio. Consequently, no further capital injection will be 
needed. In contrast, the delayed injection will cause the banks to reduce lending, leading to he burst 
of bubbles. Thus, delayed recapitalization should be less effective and more costly than prevenient 
one.
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5. Conclusion
A systemic banking crisis is extremely costly. In the worst case, it gives rise to deﬂation. The 
paper constructs an artiﬁcial economy with an asset market in which proprietors and banks interact. 
Our experimental results show that prudent credit standard is crucially important to keep the banks 
and the economy healthy. There exists an incentive on the part of an individuall bank to decline the 
standards. This can lead to rapid credit expansion, thus generating an asset bubble. This suggests 
the need for prudential regulation of banks. The monetary authority should also act promptly to 
save banks in trouble because a prevenient capital injection is more effective and less costly than a 
delayed one.
Several extensions seem interesting. First, the model needs to incorporate explicit liquidation 
rules for commercial banks to analyze contagion phenomena. The current model does not allow 
for the contagion of one bank failure to other banks because this paper assumes the central bank’s 
commitment to protect bank deposits. Second, the model does not have investment to increase 
capital stock. The shortage of risk money discourages investment, which in turn reduce aggregate 
demand. To capture deflationary spiral, investment behavior needs to be modeled. Finally, the 
central bank should be given wider range of policy tools other than capital injection. It is not difﬁcult 
to incorporate monetary policy in conjunction with the money supply.
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Figure 3: The eﬀect of a macroeconomic shock
Figure 1: Banks with Rule1
Figure 2: Banks with Rule2
48 季刊　創　価　経　済　論　集　　　　Vol. XLV, No. 1・2・3・4
㪇
㪇㪅㪈
㪇㪅㪉
㪇㪅㪊
㪇㪅㪋
㪇㪅㪌
㪇㪅㪍
㪇㪅㪎
㪇㪅㪏
㪈 㪊 㪌 㪎 㪐 㪈㪈 㪈㪊 㪈㪌 㪈㪎 㪈㪐 㪉㪈 㪉㪊 㪉㪌 㪉㪎 㪉㪐 㪊㪈 㪊㪊 㪊㪌
㪣㪸㫅㪻㩷㪧㫉㫀㪺㪼 㪣㫆㪸㫅㩷㩿㪹㪸㫅㫂㩷㪈㪀 㪣㫆㪸㫅㩷㩿㪹㪸㫅㫂㩷㪉㪀
Figure 4: Interaction between banks with asymmetric rules
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Figure 5: Inﬂuence of liquidation speed
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Figure 6: The eﬀect of the timing of recapitalization
